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Harmless Constitutional Error:
The Implications of Chapman

v. California
Philip J. Mause*
I.
A.

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

All state' and federal courts 2 are governed by statutes
which allow a trial court's verdict to be affirmed on appeal despite the existence of error in the conduct of the trial. Accordingly, various standards are formulated for determining when error at the trial stage shall be considered "harmless" and therefore not a basis for reversal. These statutes are largely the result
of a wave of judicial reform in the nineteenth century.8 Under
common law, prior to the enactment of the harmless error statutes, any error, regardless of its significance, resulted in an automatic reversal of the trial court's decision. 4 It was felt that this
rule of automatic reversal had two bad effects: It created an
unnecessary burden on the judicial system by forcing the retrial
of cases in which the result would be the same after the error had
been corrected; it led to "sharp practices" on the part of lawyers
who, sensing the weakness of their cases, would try to inject
into the record error against their own side in order to achieve an
automatic reversal on appeal.5
In balancing the interests at stake in formulating and applying a harmless error rule two aspects should be emphasized. Since
the rule does not apply until it is determined that there is error
in the record, the danger of an overly broad harmless error rule
is that verdicts based on error may be affirmed. Depending on
the nature of the error, this will lead both to an unjust result in
the case to which the rule is applied, and to a whittling away
* Assistant Professor, University of Iowa College of Law.
1. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 48-49 (1967) (Justice Harlan dissenting). See also Note, Harmless Constitutional Error, 20 STAN.
L. REV. 83 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Stanford Note].
2. FED. R. Csmn. P. 52(a); see 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1964).

3. See Stanford Note. See generally Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U.S. 750, 758-66 (1946).
4. Although early common law recognized a harmless error rule,
the "Exchequer rule" of automatic reversal was generally applied in
the United States. See L. ORPIED, CmnrnvAL APPEALs ix AMERICA
(1939).
5. See Stanford Note at 83-84.
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of the impact of the rule of law which defines the error. On
the other hand, an overly narrow harmless error rule will lead
to a waste of judicial resources through the needless reversal
and retrial of cases which should have been affirmed.
In applying the harmless error rule to criminal convictionsthe focus of this article-the balance of interests therefore involves two dangers: affirming the conviction of an innocent
defendant, or more precisely a defendant who would not have
been convicted in the absence of the error; and causing the state
the needless expense of retrying an appellant's case only to reach
the same result reached in the first trial. To state the interests to be balanced is to emphasize that uncertainty should
almost always be resolved in favor of the criminal defendant.
The problem is complicated when the error is a violation of
the Federal Constitution and when the locus is a state trial court.
Appeals from state trial courts to the state appellate level are
normally governed by state procedural rules-including state
harmless error rules. But when the appeal is based on a claim
that the Federal Constitution has been violated, the presence of
a strong federal interest militates in favor of judging the harmlessness of such violation according to a federal standard.
Until Chapman v. California,6 it was unclear whether the
harmlessness of federal constitutional error in a state court was
to be judged by a state or federal standard. In fact, there was
some suggestion that federal constitutional errors could never be
held to be harmless, and that the automatic reversal of any criminal conviction based on such error was required. A series of
cases did not even discuss the possibility that error might be
harmless, but simply reversed convictions upon a finding of constitutional error in the trial record. 7 This has led some writers to
speculate that federal constitutional error was always of such
gravity as to make a finding of harmlessness inappropriate.8
Other cases, however, indicated that federal constitutional error,
even in a federal court, could be harmless,9 although it was un6.

286 U.S. 18 (1967).

7. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (denial of a
speedy trial); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (admission of
coerced confession); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (denial
of right to counsel); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (con-

viction based on unconstitutional statute).
8. See Manwaring, California and the Fourth Amendment, 16
STAw. L. REv. 318, 325-26 (1964).
9. See Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900). See generally
Stanford Note passim.
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clear what standard of harmlessness applied.
In only one case, Motes v. United States,10 has the Supreme
Court actually held constitutional error to be harmless. In that
1900 case, the defendant had confessed to the crime in court, but
appealed the conviction on the ground that some evidence had
been admitted in violation of his sixth amendment right to be
confronted by the witnesses against him. The Supreme Court
tersely dismissed the appeal:
It would be trifling with the administration of the criminal
law to award him [the Defendant] a new trial because of a
particular error committed by the trial court, when in effect he
has stated under oath that he was guilty of the charge preferred against him."
The federal circuit courts divided on whether the admission
of illegally seized evidence in violation of Weeks v. United
States12 could ever be harmless error in a federal court. 8 When
the Supreme Court held in Mapp v. Ohio' 4 that illegally seized
evidence was inadmissable in state courts as well, it was not clear
whether automatic reversal was required whenever such error
occurred. Subsequently, a number of state appellate courts applied state harmless error statutes to Mapp violations. 5
The confusion created by the application of state harmless
error statutes to Mapp violations, as well as the general confusion
as to the relation between harmless error rules and other constitutional violations in state and federal criminal trials, led the
Supreme Court in 1963 to grant certiorari in State v. Fahy.6 In
Fahy the defendants were convicted after illegally seized evidence was admitted in violation of Mapp.' 7 On appeal the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors affirmed, holding that the admission of the illegally seized evidence was violative of Mapp, but
that the error was harmless under the Connecticut harmless error
statute.' 8 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding
10. 178 U.S. 458 (1900).
11. Id. at 476.
12. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).

13. Compare United States v. Perez, 242 F.2d 867, 870 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 354 U.S. 941 (1957), with Honig v. United States, 208 F.2d
916, 921 (8th Cir. 1953).
14. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
15. See, e.g., People v. Parham, 60 Cal. 2d 378, 384 P.2d i001, 33
Cal. Rptr. 497 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 945 (1964). At least 13
states applied their harmless error statutes to Mapp violations. See
Stanford Note at 86 n.30.
16.

149 Conn. 577, 183 A.2d 256 (1962), rev'd, 375 U.S. 85 (1963).

17. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
18.

149 Conn. 577, 183 A.2d 256 (1962), rev'd, 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
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that it was unnecessary to decide whether violations of Mapp required automatic reversal, 19 because the admission of the illegally
seized evidence was clearly not harmless.20 Warren's cryptic
opinion for the majority does not state what standard the Court
used in this case to judge harmlessness. Some commentators felt
that the Supreme Court was merely deciding that the Connecticut court had erred in its application of the Connecticut harmless
error statute, and that the Supreme Court's decision was, in essence, an interpretation of the Connecticut statute.21 There is
nothing in the opinion to support this contention, and it would
have been a colossal departure from precedent for the Supreme
22
Court to overrule a state court's interpretation of a state statute.
But neither did the Court's opinion expressly create a federal
standard for judging the harmlessness of federal constitutional
errors in state courts, thereby forbidding state courts from applying state harmless error statutes to such errors. Instead, the
Court simply stated:
We are not concerned here with whether there was sufficient evidence on which the petitioner could have been convicted without the evidence complained of. The question is
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. To decide
this question, it is necessary to23 review the facts of the case and
the evidence adduced at trial.
In dissent, Mr. Justice Harlan saw this difficulty and accused
the majority of skirting the key issue of the case:
Does the 14th Amendment prevent a State from applying
its harmless error rule in a criminal trial with respect to the
erroneous admission of evidence
obtained through an unconstitutional search and seizure? 24
Harlan's answer to this question was "no"--although he did not
make it clear whether he felt state harmless error statutes should
be applicable to all federal constitutional errors. While he
stated that "it may well be that a confession is never to be considered as nonprejudicial," 25 Harlan argued that Mapp violations
should be exposed to state harmless error statutes:
Since the harmless error rule plainly affords no shield
under which prosecutors might use damaging evidence, un19.
20.
21.
22.

375 U.S. 85 (1963).
Id. at 86.
See, e.g., Stanford Note at 86-87.
Murdock v. City of Memphis, 8,7U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874).

23.

375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963).

24. Id. at 92.
25. Id. at 95.
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constitutionally obtained, to secure a conviction, there is no
danger that application of the rule will undermine
the prophylactic function of the rule of inadmissibility.2 6

Harlan was correct in accusing the majority of avoiding the
issue as he posed it. The Court certainly could not have been
simply reversing the Connecticut court's construction of a Connecticut statute; such a rationale would fly in the face of the
well-established rule that the Supreme Court is bound by state
court interpretations of state statutes.27 If the Court meant that
it was establishing a federal harmless error standard, it should
have so stated. It should not have left open the very plausible
implication that it was merely holding that the state court's
decision-that the federal constitutional error was harmless in
this particular case-was based on an "inadequate" state
ground.2 1
Commentators were uncertain as to the meaning of the Fahy
decision. One possibility was that state courts could continue
applying state harmless error statutes to federal constitutional
errors, being reversed only when the Supreme Court felt "there
[was] a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of
might have contributed to- the conviction." 29 In such a case the
harmlessness of the error would constitute an inadequate state
ground for affirming a conviction."0 An alternative theory was
that the Supreme Court had articulated a uniform federal standard, binding on all state appellate courts, for the determination of
the harmlessness of federal constitutional error. 31 In practice,
courts of a number of states-including California 3l -continued
to apply state harmless error statutes to federal constitutional
errors, even after Fahy.
B. Chapmanv. California
In Chapman, the petitioners were convicted of murder in a
California state court. Both petitioners chose not to testify during their trial, and, pursuant to Art. I, section 13 of the California
26. Id. at 94.
27. See note 22 supra, and accompanying text.
28. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
29. See note 23 supra, and accompanying text.
30. See notes 66-67 infra, and accompanying text.
31. Cf. 38 TULANEL.REV. 787 (1964).
32. See, e.g., People v.Cruz, 61 Cal. 2d 861, 395 P.2d 889, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 841 (1964).
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Constitution,33 the prosecutor in his summation to the jury commented at length on their failure to testify and the inferences of
their guilt that could be drawn from their silence.34 After the
trial, but before the California Supreme Court decision on appeal, the United States Supreme Court held in Griffin v. California 5 that Art. I, section 13 of the California Constitution was
violative of the Federal Constitution. The Court reasoned that
the practice of allowing prosecutors to comment on the silence of
criminal defendants who refuse to testify unconstitutionally penalized the exercise of the fifth amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. In Tehan v. United States ex rel.
Shott 3 6 the Supreme Court announced that Griffin would be applied only prospectively, but that cases which were not final on
appeal before the Griffin decision was announced would be tested
under the Griffin rule.
The California Supreme Court 37 held that, although the
petitioners had been denied a federal constitutional right as defined in Griffin, the error was harmless under the California
Constitution's harmless error provision. That provision provides that errors shall be harmless and verdicts below affirmed unless "the court shall be of the opinion that the error
38
complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice."
The defendants filed a petition for certiorari arguing that
violations of Griffin can never be held harmless and, alternatively, that under a federal standard, the error could not be
considered harmless in the instant case. With Mr. Justice Black
writing for a majority of seven, the Supreme Court held that:
(1) "whether a conviction for crime should stand when a state
has failed to accord federal constitutionally guaranteed rights"'3 9
is a federal question to be decided under federal law; (2) a rule of
automatic reversal shall not apply -to all federal constitutional
errors because "there may be some constitutional errors which
in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insig33.

It provides:

In any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or

not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the -case against him may be commented
upon by the court and by counsel, and may be considered by
the court or the jury.
34. People v. Teale, 63 Cal. 2d 178, 404 P.2d 209, 45 Cal. Rptr. 729

(1965), rev'd sub nom., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).

35. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
36. 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
37. People v. Teale, 63 Cal. 2d 178, 404 P.2d 209, 45 Cal. Rptr.
729 (1965).
38. CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, § 4Y.
39. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 20-21 (1967).
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nificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution,
be deemed harmless; ' 40 (3) a federal harmless error rule shall
apply to all federal constitutional errors and the beneficiary of a
constitutional error must "prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained;"' 41 and (4) applying the federal standard to the instant
42
case, the error cannot be held to be harmless.
Justice Stewart concurred in a separate opinion and argued
that a rule of automatic reversal should be applied to all violations of Griffin v. California.4 3 Stewart's opinion highlighted one
of the central ambiguities in the majority opinion. It is unclear
whether, after Chapman v. California, there are any classes of
cases to which the rule of automatic reversal still applies-or
whether the new federal harmless error rule now applies to all
violations of federal constitutional rights.44 Certainly, Stewart
is correct in arguing that there are a large number of pre-Chapman cases which hold that various kinds of constitutional error
call for automatic reversal. 45 None of these cases are expressly
overruled in the majority opinion. In fact, Black's citation of
Payne v. Arkansas40 in the closing paragraph of his opinion
for the Court 47 seems to imply that certain classes of constitutional errors still call for automatic reversal. 48 But nothing
is said explicitly, nor is any test suggested for determining
which classes of constitutional error, if any, are appropriate for
automatic reversal. It is not surprising that post-Chapman litigation has developed over this point.49 It is simply unclear
whether Chapman applies only to Griffin violations (minimal
holding), to all constitutional violations (maximum holding),
40. Id. at 21-22.
41. Id. at 22-24.
42. Id. at 24-26.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 42-45.
45. See cases cited note 7 supra.
46. 356 U.S. 560 (1958). This case held that the admission of a
coerced confession required the application of a rule of automatic reversal.
47. 386 U.S. 18, 26 (1967). See note 129 infra.
48. Justice Stewart seems to feel that none of the pre-Chapman
automatic reversal holdings are overruled by Chapman, although he
states that "one source of my disagreement with the Court's opinion is
its implicit assumption that the same harmless error rule should apply
indiscriminately to all constitutional violations." Id. at 44-45. Some
commentators have argued that the Chapman rule now applies to all
constitutional error and that automatic reversal will never be applied.
See 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 208 (1967).
49. See note 131 infra.
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or to classes of violations other than those in Griffin, but not
all. The only certainty is that state harmless error rules no
longer apply to any violations of the Federal Constitution.
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented on the ground that a state's
construction of its own harmless error rule constituted an independent and adequate state ground. 50 He argued that even the
majority opinion seemed to concede that a federal harmless error
rule is not constitutionally required 1 and that the decision must
therefore rest on the spurious ground that the Supreme Court
has a supervisory power over state courts. Harlan emphasized
that "[t] he Court has no power... to declare which of many admittedly constitutional alternatives a state may choose." 5 2 Federal constitutional rights are sufficiently protected if the Supreme Court limits its review in this area to two questions. First,
is the harmless error provision itself consistent with the guarantee of due process in the fourteenth amendment? 53 Second,
when a harmless error provision is applied to a federal constitutional right, is the application reasonable and not an arbitrary
attempt to evade the federal right? 5'L *Hethen went on to argue
that both of these questions should be answered affirmatively
in the Chapman case.
Harlan's dissent also focuses on an ambiguity in the majority
opinion. The basis or rationale by which the Court undertakes to
create federal law in this area is not made clear. Black's opinion
raises a strong implication that Congress could create a statutory
federal harmless error rule 55-presumably acting under section
five of the fourteenth amendment.5" If the rule prescribed by
50. 306 U.S. 18, 45-47 (1967).
51. Justice Black wrote:
We have no hesitation in saying that the right of these
petitioners not to be punished for exercising their Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment right to be silent-expressly created
by the Federal Constitution itself-is a federal right which, in
the absence of appropriatecongressionalaction, it is our responsibility to protect by fashioning the necessary rule.
Id. at 21 (emphasis added). Justice Harlan interpreted this as an assertion that Congress could enact a different rule, and that, therefore,
the Court's rule was not constitutionally required. Id. at 46.
52. Id.at 48.
53. Id. at 51.
54. Id. It is unclear whether Harlan would require the application
of a state harmless error statute to be both unreasonable and evasive of
federal rights before reversal by the Supreme Court would be justifiedor whether any application which is either unreasonable or evasive of
constitutional rights would justify reversal. Id. at 51, 54-56.
55. See note 51 supra.
56. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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the Court in Chapman is not, therefore, a constitutional necessity,
it is unclear what kind of power the Court purports to wield over
state procedure and how far, in fact, Congress could go in changing the Chapman rule. Although the opinion makes these problems academic at least until Congress acts, the decision might be
read as enlarging the Court's power to supervise state procedure
in the adjudication of federal constitutional rights. As a result,
it may have considerable impact on creating uniform federal
rules defining standards in other areas where state law affects
the vitality of federal constitutional rights in state courts.
This article will thus consider the two primary questions left
unanswered by the Chapman decision: the source of the Court's
power exercised in Chapman and the applicability, after Chapman, of the rule of automatic reversal to other classes of constitutional error.
II.

SOURCE OF POWER FOR A FEDERAL HARMLESS
ERROR RULE

A. THE ChapmanIMPLICATION
It is not in a purely academic spirit that the source of the
power of the Supreme Court to impose federal law in this area is
now scrutinized. Although Justice Black disposed of the problem rather tersely,57 Justice Harlan felt that the Court's assertion of power in Chapman had a volcanic effect on the state-federal balance.58 In addition, the problem does have overtones
that may be significant in the future. Justice Black, writing for
the majority, gratuitously intimated that Congress could change
the Chapman result. 9 The extent of that putative Congressional
power may depend on the nature of the power the Court asserted
in fashioning the Chapman rule. For example, it is interesting
to speculate on the Court's reaction to a federal statute redele60
gating the power to fashion harmless error rules to the states.
Finally, depending on the rationale supporting it, the power
asserted by the Supreme Court in Chapman to create federal law,
57. See text accompanying note 63 infra.
Whether a conviction for crime should stand when a state has
failed to accord federal constitutionally guaranteed rights is
every bit as much of a federal question as what particular federal constitutional provisions themselves mean, what they guarantee, and whether they have been denied.
386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967).
58. Id. at 57.

59. See note 51 supra.
60.

Cf. United States v. Sharpnack, 375 U.S. 286 (1958).
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binding on state courts, may constitute a precedent for the judicial promulgation of other rules binding on state courts in their
adjudication of federal constitutional rights.61
If the Supreme Court had held that the federal harmless error rule set forth in Chapman was a constitutional requirement,
there would, of course, have been little conceptual difficulty.
The Supreme Court has the power to force state courts to follow
the Federal Constitution under the supremacy clause.6 2 The difficulty is that Black's opinion strongly implies that the federal
harmless error rule is not a constitutional requirement by stating
that Congress has the power to act in this area and further, by its
characterization of the rule's promulgation:
With faithfulness to the constitutional union of the States, we
cannot leave to the States the formulation of the authoritative
laws, rules, and remedies designed to protect people from infractions by the States of federally guaranteed rights. We have
no hesitation in saying that the right of these petitioners not
to be punished for exercising their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be silent--expressly created by the Federal
Constitution itself-is a federal right which, in the absence of
appropriate congressional action, it is 63
our responsibility to protect by fashioning the necessary rule.

This led Justice Harlan to criticize the holding, by asserting:
"The Court has no power, however, to declare which of many
admittedly constitutional alternatives a state may choose. 01 4 As
he correctly pointed out, "[t]here is no necessity for a state to
have a harmless error rule at all." 65 Harlan's view that the Court's
power to overrule state law regulating the adjudication of federal
constitutional rights is limited to instances in which the state has
chosen an unconstitutional "alternative" would still have left the
Court with a number of rationales for limiting the impact of state
harmless error rules on federal constitutional rights.0 6

B. TRADITIONAL ALTERNATIVES
In analyzing what the Court actually did in Chapman,it may
be helpful to discuss briefly some other approaches that the Court
could have taken to the problem presented by state harmless
error rules.
61.

See 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 208-09 (1967).

62. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
63.

386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967).

64. Id. at 48.
65. Id. at 48 n.2. Of course, if a state had no harmless error rule,
it would apply the rule of automatic reversal and the constitutional issue
of that rule's prejudice to federal rights would never arise.
66. Id. at 50-51.
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1. Inadequate State Ground
Before Chapman, a state court's finding that a federal constitutional error was harmless under a state harmless error statute
would normally have been an "independent and adequate" state
ground for affirming the trial court's judgment, and would have
precluded Supreme Court review under the long-established rule
of Murdock v. Memphis.6 7 It is clear, however, that the Supreme
Court has the power to find a state ground "inadequate" in certain situations.08
The most recent authoritative discussion of the doctrine's
linitations was Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in
Henry v. Mississippi6 9 Brennan first distinguished between
"substantive" and "procedural" state grounds, and stated that
70
the former always preclude Supreme Court reversal.

It is

not certain whether a harmless error rule would be considered
"substantive" or "procedural." Brennan further implied that
even procedural state grounds can be overcome only when they
serve "no substantial state interest."7' However, state harmless
error rules always serve a state interest-the interest of avoiding
the time-consuming and expensive retrial of cases where the ultimate result after retrial will inevitably be the same as if the
72
conviction had been affirmed.
Of course, if state harmless error rules were applied in such
a way as to discriminate against federal rights or to evade rules of
constitutional due process, the state ground could be ruled inadequate. 73 But it might be difficult to prove such discrimination in view of the subjectivity involved in applying any harmless
error test.74 In addition, even a non-discriminatory harmless
error test might easily be applied to erode federal rights; the
mere fact that it also erodes rights granted under state law
should make it no less objectionable. 75
67. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
68. See generally Note, The Untenable Nonfederal Ground in the

Supreme Court,74 HARv. L. Rnv. 1375 (1961).
69. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
70. Id. at 446-47.
71. Id. at 447-51.
72. Stanford Note at 83-85.

73. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 51 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
74. Any harmless error standard will involve considerable judicial
discretion. This is not only because each constitutional error is unique
(for example, the nature and number of a prosecutor's comments on a
defendant's failure to testify), but also because the harmlessness of
each error must be evaluated on the basis of the entire record. (Justice
Black does this in Chapman, Id. at 24-26).

75. A nondiscriminatory harmless error rule which was too loose
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Even on the assumption that aoplication of the inadequate
state ground approach would be conceptually sound, serious difficulties would remain where the Supreme Court felt the application of such a statute operated to frustrate a federal constitutional right. The Supreme Court, a majority of which clearly
feels that errors can be too easily held "harmless"7 6 under present
state statutes, would be committed to a case-by-case review of
their application and a piecemeal adjudication of their "adequacy" as applied to an infinite variety of fact situations. The
burden of petitions for certiorari on this issue would either absorb much of the Court's time or would force it to deny certiorari in the bulk of cases. The latter course could be defended
because the resolution of any individual case in its unique fact
setting would have little precedential value,77 but would endanger the very constitutional rights the Chapman Court sought
to protect; it would leave intact numerous convictions in which
the Court would not be satisfied that the error was really "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."7 8 The promulgation of a federal harmless error rule in Chapman raises many of these same
problems.7 9 Indeed, the Chapman result would have been almost
identical if the Court had held that the finding of harmless error was an inadequate state ground, and stated that a similar result would be reached in every case unless the state can "prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained." 80
It would be difficult to expand the scope of the "inadequate
state ground" rationale to the extent of achieving the same net
result as was reached in Chapman. This is illustrated by Harlan's
disposition of the issues in the case. Harlan would not support
such a broad interpretation of the Court's power to find a state
ground "inadequate." He would limit this power to cases in
which the application of a state harmless error rule was "unreasonable" and "manifesting a purpose to defeat federal constitutional rights;" 8' he found that the California Supreme Court's
finding of harmlessness in the Chapman case was not an inwould affirm convictions in which any error-constitutional or nonconstitutional-is not clearly enough non-prejudicial.
76. The Chapman test is stricter than most state standards. See
81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 206 n.12 (1967).

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See note 74 supra.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
See text accompanying notes 171-76 infra.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
Id. at 56.
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adequate state ground under that standard. 2
The real issue, then, is not whether the inadequate state
ground conceptualization should have been used, but whether
the Supreme Court must always allow state appellate courts to
affirm convictions on the basis of harmless error rules as long as
those rules are not applied with an intent to defeat federal constitutional rights.
2.

Unconstitutionalityof the Rule

Another approach open to the Supreme Court would have
been a finding that the harmless error rule itself is unconstitutional as a denial of due process.8 3 Moreover, while a criminal
8 4
defendant probably has no constitutional right to an appeal,
once a state creates that right, a combination of the due process
and equal protection clauses prevents the state from limiting it so
as to discriminate against the poor.8 5 However, harmless error
statutes could not be readily attacked under this rationale. If the
state has no obligation to grant an appeal, it would seem permissible for a state to limit the right to reversal on appeal to those
cases in which the trial court's error was clearly prejudicial.
A more specific attack on the constitutionality of harmless
error rules is suggested in the Court's recent holding in Duncan
v. Louisiana;86 state harmless error rules could be attacked as
violative of a criminal defendant's constitutional right to trial by
jury in a state court.8 7 When a state court affirms a conviction
on the basis of a harmless error statute, its action could be
analogized to a judicial retrial of the defendant's case. Arguably, the defendant has a constitutional right to another trial of
his case before a jury-at least in cases where the appellate court
loosely construes a harmless error rule and tests the harmlessness of the error by asking, for example, whether it would have
reached the same verdict absent the error or whether it thinks
the defendant is guilty. Of course, this rationale was not available at the time of the Chapman decision. 88
82. Id. at 54-56.
83. Of course, if the harmless error rule itself is held unconstitutional-it could not be applied even to nonconstitutional errors.
84. "A State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide
appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all." Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
85. Id. at 16-20.
86. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
87. The Duncan case was decided on May 20, 1968. Thus, this
rationale was not really available to the Court in Chapman.
88. See note 87 supra.
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A successful constitutional attack on a harmless error rule

would mean that any application of the unconstitutional statute
-whether to a federal constitutional error or to an error under
state law-would be improper. It would also mean that Congress could not reverse the Court's ruling that the harmless error
standard was unconstitutional.8 9
3.

Protectionfrom Interference with ConstitutionalRightsThe "Partand Parcel"Doctrine

The Court could also have held that a federal harmless error
standard is "part and parcel" of the federal constitutional rights
it protects. This rationale is suggested by Jackson v. Denno, °
where the Court held unconstitutional the New York procedure
of submitting the voluntary confession question to the jury if
the judge determines that a "fair question" exists. In that case,
the state procedure was ruled violative of the Constitution because it did not afford sufficient protection to the defendant's
privilege against compelled self-incrimination. 91
This rationale has never been applied to constitutional rights
in general, but only to void a procedure or practice that interferes with some specific constitutional right. Of course, constitutional rights can be defined so as to include a harmless error
standard. Thus, the right against compelled self-incrimination
could be defined as a right not to be convicted on the basis of
compelled self-incrimination or, more precisely, a right not to be
convicted when it cannot be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt"
that compelled self-incrimination "did not contribute to the ver92
dict.,
The rigidity of the harmless error test might vary with the
constitutional right. Harlan suggests that due process may require automatic reversal for certain classes of constitutional error.9 3 On the other hand, the majority of the Court seems to feel
that a defendant has no constitutional protection from a conviction based on evidence admitted in violation of Mapp v. Ohio.9 4
Indeed, in any case in which a constitutional rule is not applied
89. See note 63 supra, and accompanying text.
90.

91.
similar
92.
federal
93.

378 U.S. 368 (1964).

Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), seems to rest on a
rationale.
See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (the Chapman
harmless error test).
Id at 52 n.7.

94. But see Linkletter v. Walker, 8381 U.S. 618, 648 (1965)
J., dissenting).

(Black,
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retrospectively, it is difficult to argue that a constitutional right
not to be convicted on the basis of such error has been created.9 5
Defining constitutional rights so that they include or simply
limit harmless error standards may appear to be little more than
a semantic exercise. On the other hand, a constitutional right
could become illusory if a sufficiently loose harmless error standard were permitted. Where the Constitution itself gives a criminal
defendant a right not to be convicted on the basis of a certain
kind of error, that right must include at least minimal protection
against an overly broad harmless error test. The scope of such
protection should be the constitutional limit on the extent to
which Congress can displace the Chapmanrule9 8
C. PossIBLE Chapman RATioNALES
1. Supervisory Power
Although the Court did not dwell on the source of its power
to create a federal harmless error rule,97 it has long been held
that the Supreme Court has a supervisory power over the lower
federal courts. Under this power, it can prescribe rules for these
courts to follow even though the rules are not constitutional
necessities. This power to mold judge-made law is exemplified
in McNabb v. United States98 and Mallory v. United States.99 In
these cases the Court held that although the exclusion of confessions, obtained after unreasonably long detention without indictment, was not constitutionally required, the Court would require
it in its role as supervisor "of the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts."' 00 Arguably, the rule of Weeks v.
United States,'0 ' which required the exclusion from the federal
courts of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment,
10 2
was also based on this supervisory power.
Recent cases seem to indicate that the Supreme Court may
have a similar supervisory power over state courts in their adjudication of federal constitutional rights. In Miranda v. Arizona,10 3 Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, stated:
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See note 191 infra.
See text accompanying note 63 supra.
See note 57 supra.
318 U.S. 332 (1943).
354 U.S. 449 (1957).
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943).
232 U.S. 383 (1914).
102. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39 (1949) (Black, J., concurring).
103. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives
for protecting the privilege [against compelled self-incrimination] which might be devised by Congress or the States in the
exercise of their creative rule-making capacities. Therefore, we
cannot say that the Constitution nezessarily requires adherence
to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the
interrogatory process as it is presently conducted. Our decision
in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which will
handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have
that effect. We encourage Congress and the states to continue
their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws. However, unless we are shown
other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising
accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity
to exercise it, the following safeguards must
04
be observed.'
The fact that the Miranda rule is not constitutionally required,
or at least that there are no constitutional alternatives, suggests
that its promulgation rests on a power of the Supreme Court to
create non-constitutional law binding state courts in the adjudication of federal rights.10 5
2.

Federal Common Law

Another line of cases asserts a power to create federal common law, binding on state courts in the adjudication of federal
causes of action. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad'0 6 was an action brought under the Federal Employer's
Liability Act in a state court. On appeal the Supreme Court held
that both the substantive standards for determining the validity
of releases and the procedure for adjudicating their validity was
a matter of federal rather than state law. A number of cases
support this general approach.1° 7 O course, a criminal trial in a
state court is not a federal cause of action, and this rationale
would not seem to enable federal standards to govern the trial
on the mere justification that a federal issue is involved. But
once a defendant is convicted and appeals on the ground that his
conviction is violative of the Federal Constitution, his appeal is
analogous to a federal cause of action. If it is fictionalized as a
separate action, the appeal is a cause of action in a state court
based entirely on federal law. 104.

Id. at 467.

105.
106.
107.

Cf. 80 HARv. L. REV. 91, 201-07 (3.966).
342 U.S. 359 (1952).
See, e.g., Central Vermont Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507 (1915);

cf. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
generally Friendly, In Praise of Erie, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383 (1964).

See
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This constitutional characterization of appeals as "federal
causes of action" may supply a rationale for the Chapman rule.
The federal harmless error rule applies only on appeal; it has no
impact on the trial of criminal cases in state courts. In fashioning it, therefore, the Court is merely asserting the role of federal
common law as governing federal causes of action in state
courts. This conceptualization of the Chapman decision would
limit the Court's assertion of power to appeals based on federal
grounds, and would imply that the power of the states over the
trial of state criminal cases is not challenged by the Chapman
decision as Justice Harlan seems to fear.Os Moreover, if an
appeal is viewed as a separate action, it can be argued that the
harmless error test is a substantive, rather than a procedural
rule. The standard for judging the harmlessness of error is in
fact the standard for deciding whether to reverse or affirm.
Thus, Chapman may not seriously alter the general rule that
state law governs state appellate procedure-even in the adjudication of federal rights. 0 9
Whether it is conceptualized as "federal common law" or a
"supervisory power," it now seems clear that the Supreme Court
has the power to make non-constitutional law, binding on the
state courts, when such law is necessary to protect constitutional
rights. Although the rationale given above may furnish a justification for limiting this power to substantive rules governing
appeals, it is likely that the Court will extend it when necessary.
For example, Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Miranda v. Arizona suggests that this power extends to pretrial procedure. 10
It is not unthinkable that trial procedure, procedure for jury
selection, and appellate procedure will come within its scope.

D.

JUDiCiAL

EcoNoMy-A DocTRnm OF NEcEssITY

What may seem objectionable about the Court's assertion of
power is the refusal to elucidate the standards for determining
when its exercise is necessary to protect constitutional rights.
In Chapman, the creation of the federal harmless error rule may
be necessary to avoid the wasteful case-by-case confrontation
between the Supreme Court and state appellate courts that
would occur were the Court to rely on the due process, part and
parcel, or inadequate state ground rationales."' Rather than re108.
109.
110.
111.

See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 56-57 (1967).
See, e.g., Parker v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571 (1948).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
This is what might have occurred if for example, the Court
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verse individual state court decisions because they either violate
the Constitution or fail to protect constitutional rights, the Supreme Court in the interest of judicial economy has simply announced a standard and proclaimed that the failure to meet it
will result in reversal.
Perhaps this approach is necessary whenever the Court is
faced with a similar situation. Whenever the Court would be
forced either to grant certiorari and review a multitude of individual and unique cases or to deny certiorari in many of them
and thereby allow constitutionally tainted convictions to
stand,112 the Court should have the power to paint a bright line
over which state appellate courts cannot step. Although the line
protects a larger area than is constitutionally required, its existence is necessary to avoid forcing the Court either to adjudicate
exhaustively the jagged edges of the constitutional right or to
leave the adjudication to the States. This would seem to be one
rationale for the Miranda rule. The Court was faced with the
possibility of a case-by-case adjudication of the voluntariness of
confessions; 1 3 a clear rule, at least clearer than the standard of
"voluntariness," was necessary to protect the Court from the
burden of reviewing numerous cases on their facts." 4
If this is the justification for the Chapman rule, it is questionable whether the federal harmless error rule achieves its desired goal. All harmless error tests are subjective in nature." 5
As Justice Harlan pointed out, the formulation of a particular
standard for harmless error really gives lower courts little guidance." 6 The Supreme Court may often differ with state courts
on whether there was a "reasonable possibility" that an error led
to a conviction in the fact setting of a particular case, or that a
certain error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus,
the Court may be faced with the same gargantuan task of review
it seems to be trying to avoid; it will be forced to review numerhad merely based its decision in Chapman on an inadequate state
ground rationale and not given any guidance as to its standards for
deciding when a state ground will be found to be "inadequate." See
20 VAND.L.REV. 1157, 1160-61 (1967).
112. The certiorari practice of the Supreme Court might dictate a
policy of refusing to review cases which would afford little guidance as
precedent because the decisions would be based on assessments of unique
fact situations. See generally Hart, Forward: The Time Chart of the
Justices, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HARv. L. REV. 84, 96-98
(1959).
113. See text accompanying notes 196-200 infra.

114. Id.

115. See generally Note, The Harmless Error Rule Reviewed, 47
COLum. L. REv. 450 (1947).
116. 386 U.S. 18, 53 (1967); see 45 No. CAR.L. REv. 1044, 1047 (1967).
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ous individual applications of the federal harmless error rule.1 1 7
Automatic reversal, at least for certain categories of constitutional error, may be the only real solution to this dilemma.
III. THE STATUS OF AUTOMATIC REVERSAL
AFTER CHAPMAN
A. THE PRE-Chapman POSITION
A number of Supreme Court decisions before Chapman expressly or impliedly held that a rule of automatic reversal is to be
applied to various classes of constitutional error. These decisions
are often ambiguous, and sometimes the Court seems to have
been operating upon an unconscious assumption that all constitutional errors require the application of a rule of automatic reversal.
In Tumey v. Ohio, 118 the defendant's right to due process
was violated because the trial judge had a financial interest in
his conviction. The Court tersely disposed of the contention that
the conviction should be affirmed due to the overwhelming evidence on the record against the defendant, by stating that "[n] o
matter what the evidence was against him, he had the right to
have an impartial judge." 19 This has been taken to mean that a
rule of automatic reversal applies to this kind of constitutional
violation,120 although the Court did not explicitly grant the defendant a right of reversal whenever the judge is not impartial.
2
In Gideon v. Wainwright,1
1 the Supreme Court did not discuss the possibility that the denial of a constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel might constitute harmless error. Other
cases explicitly state that, when there has been a denial of the
right to counsel, "we do not stop to determine whether prejudice
22
resulted."
In Payne v. Arkansas,123 the defendant was convicted in a
trial at which an involuntary confession was admitted into evidence. The contention that the conviction could be affirmed on
117. It seems that the Court has decided to review state interpretations of the Chapman rule. See cases cited note 132 infra.
118.

273 U.S. 510 (1927).

119. Id. at 535.
120. See Note, Individualized Criminal Justice in the Supreme
Court: A Study of Dispositional Decision Making, 81 HAR. L. REv.
1260, 1273-74 (1968).
121. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
122. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961). See also White v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963).
123. 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
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the ground that the admission of the confession constituted
"harmless error" was rejected by the Court:
Respondent suggests that, apart from the confession, there
was adequate evidence before the jury to sustain the verdict.
But where, as here, a coerced confession constitutes a part of the
evidence before the jury and a general verdict is returned, no
one can say what credit and weight the jury gave to the confession. And in these circumstances this Court has uniformly
held that even though there may have been sufficient evidence,
apart from the coerced confession, to support a judgment of
conviction, the admission in evidence, over objection, of the cothe
erced confession vitiates the judgment because it1 violates
24
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In other areas, the Court has either explicitly held that automatic reversal applies125 or acted under an implicit assumption
that lack of prejudice can never be a ground for affirming a conviction.
B.

126

THE ChapmanAMIGUITY

Black's opinion for the Court in Chapman does little to clarify the current status of these cases or the possibility of expanding the rule of automatic reversal into other areas. He states:
We conclude that there may be some constitutional errors
which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant
and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal
not requiring the automatic
Constitution, be deemed harmless,
27
reversal of the conviction.'
But it is not clear whether "some constitutional errors" means
"certain classes of constitutional error" or "any kind of constitutional error which is unimportant and insignificant in the context of a particular case." Black later states:
Although our prior cases have indicated that there are some
constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction
can never be treated as harmless error, this statement in Fahy
itself belies any belief that all trial errors 28which violate the
Constitution automatically call for reversal.'

But, again, it is unclear whether "some constitutional errors"
means "some classes of error" or "some particular cases of
error." 29 Finally, he closes with a favorable reference to Payne
v. Arkansas:
124. Id. at 567-68 (footnote omitted).
125. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
126. See, e.g., Rideau v. Louisiana. 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (right to
fair jury impaired by prejudicial publicity). See also O'Connor v. Ohio,
385 U.S. 92 (1966), in which the Supreme Court reversed on the basis
of Griffin without considering whether the error was harmless.
127. 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
128. Id. at 23 (footnote omitted).
129. Since Black, in making the above statement, cites Payne v.
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Such a machine-gun repetition of a denial of constitutional
rights, all designed and calculated to make petitioners' version
of the evidence worthless, can no more be considered harmless
than the introduction against a defendant of a coerced confession. See, e.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560. Petitioners
are entitled30to a trial free from the pressure of unconstitutional
inferences.

This statement seemingly acknowledges that the admission of
coerced confessions calls for automatic reversal.
Rather than dwell on the delphic complexity of Black's
opinion, we can probably assume that the Court did not intend to
overrule Tumey, Payne or Gideon sub silentio, and that the
harmless error rule will not be applied to those three classes of
constitutional errors.' 3' It is still important, however, to try to
formulate criteria for deciding whether automatic reversal is appropriate for any other general classes of constitutional error.
In the absence of an extension of the principle of automatic reversal, the Supreme Court will shoulder the heavy burden of
supervising the application of a necessarily vague federal harmless error rule-a rule which will raise a potential issue in almost
every case of a constitutional error. In addition, state appellate
courts will also have a heavy burden of deciding the harmlessness of particular constitutional errors. Of course, state courts
Arkansas, Gideon v. Wainwright, and Tumey v. Ohio, he probably
means that any error which falls into the categories established by
these cases calls for the application of a rule of automatic reversal.
130. 386 U.S. ht 26.
131. But see 81 HARv. L. REV. 69, 208 (1967). Supreme Court opinions since Chapman have only beclouded this question. In Burgett v.
Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 111 (1967), Douglas writing for the Court stated,
The admission of a prior criminal conviction which is constitutionally infirm under the standards of Gideon v. Wainwright is
inherently prejudicial and we are unable to say that the instructions to disregard it made the constitutional error harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt within the meaning of Chapman v.

California.

It is unclear whether this means that a rule of automatic reversal applies to violations of Burgett or merely that Burgett is violated despite
an instruction to disregard the tainted conviction.
In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 300 (1967), Brennan, writing for
the Court, applied Chapman to a violation of Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967) (right to counsel at a line-up). See also Biggers v.
Tennessee, 390 U.S. 404, 409 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Harlan dissented in Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967), and
argued that Chapman should be applied to an unconstitutional denial
of the right to a preliminary hearing transcript.
In Hamilton v. California, 389 U.S. 921, 922 n.4 (1967), Fortas, in a
dissent from a denial of certiorari, implies that Chapman should be
applied to the unconstitutional admission of an admission.
In Whitney v. California, 389 U.S. 138, 140 (1967), Douglas applied
Chapman to a denial of change of venue because of prejudicial pretrial television publicity.
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have always had this burden, but until Chapman, a substantial
number of these cases were probably affirmed on appeal due to
the application of state harmless error rules. Under Chapman, it
is likely that-depending on how strictly the Supreme Court supervises state court application of the federal harmless error
rule32-very few cases will be affirmed which would not have
33
been affirmed under an automatic reversal rule.
C.

CLASSIFICATION OF CASES

WORTHYr OF AUToMATIc REVERSAL

While the Court has rejected a blanket application of an
automatic reversal rule to all constitutional error,1 34 it may be
possible to define classes of cases to which automatic reversal
should be applied. It should be remembered that the claimed
advantage for a harmless error rule over a rule of automatic
reversal is judicial economy-those cases in which error is held
to be harmless will be affirmed and therefore need not be retried
on remand. However, the Court's harmless error rule will lead to
very few convictions being affirmed,135 and the small number of
retrials avoided by holding errors harmless may not justify the
burden of constant litigation on the harmlessness of error issue.
Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion takes the position that
judicial economy would actually be served more efficiently by a
rule of automatic reversal-at least with respect to Griffin violations.136 Of course, it should be noted that the definition of
classes of cases worthy of automatic reversal may also involve a
process which requires considerable litigation. This burden
should be taken into account in determining the net judicial
economy. It may also suggest the wisdom of instituting an
automatic reversal rule for all federal constitutional errors.
Our task, then, should be to analyze criteria for determining
purposive categories of cases to which automatic reversal should
be applied.
1.

Inherently PrejudicialErrors
Certain definable classes of constitutional error are almost

132. The Supreme Court has already asserted its power to review
state decisions construing the Chapman standard. Fontaine v. California, 390 U.S. 593 (1968). This issue can arise not only on
certiorari, but also on review of a petition for habeas corpus. See, e.g.,
Anderson v. Nelson, 390 U.S. 523 (1968).
133. See 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 207-08 (1967).
134. See note 127 supra, and accompanying text.
135. See note 133 supra, and accompanying text.
136. 386 U.S. 18, 45 (1967).
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never "harmless." Arguably, judicial economy would be best
served by applying a rule of automatic reversal to all cases that
fall within such classes, rather than by allowing the state to
argue that the error was harmless and lose in the overwhelming
majority of cases. Application of a rule of automatic reversal
will lessen the burden on the judicial system by removing the
issue of "harmlessness" from a large number of cases on appeal.
Simple judicial economy, then, may dictate the application of a
rule of automatic reversal.
There are two reasons why a class of cases may be appropriate for automatic reversal under this rationale. The first is
that the prejudicial impact of certain kinds of constitutional error is inherently indeterminable. In these situations, it is simply
impossible to determine the extent to which the error damaged
the defendant's chances for acquittal. Therefore, a fortiori, it
should be impossible ever to find such error harmless under the
Chapman test which demands a showing that there was not "a
reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might
have contributed to the conviction"'13 7 and that the error was
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 13s
The impact of violations of Gideon v. Wainwright,139 for example, cannot be intelligently assessed because no appellate court
can fairly determine what would have happened at the trial stage
had the defendant not been denied his constitutional right to
counsel.1 40 The rule of automatic reversal has been, 41 and
should be in the future, 142 applied to violations of Gideon since
it would be impossible ever to find such errors harmless under
the Chapman standards.
Any error which impinges on the integrity of the jury is
likewise inherently indeterminable in prejudicial impact. It is
impossible, and perhaps a denial of a defendant's constitutional
right to trial by jury, 43 for an appellate court to speculate on the
result had the defendant been provided with a constitutional
jury. Such speculation would substitute an appellate court,
which can never have the benefit of observing the demeanor of
137. Id. at 24.
138. Id.
139. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
140. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
141. See cases cited note 122 supra.
142. But see Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 109 (1967). It would seem
that to the extent that any pretrial proceeding prejudices a defendant's case, the failure to accord him the right to counsel at such a proceeding should result in automatic reversal.
143. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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the witnesses, for the jury to which the defendant has a constitutional right. It would be tantamount to a directed verdict of
"guilty." For this reason, denial of the right to a jury in a state
court,' 44 pretrial publicity violations,145 racial discrimination in
selection, 146 and any other error which goes to the integrity of
the jury which convicted the defendant, should invoke the application of an automatic reversal rule.
Similarly, errors which involve the integrity or the impartiality of the judge before whom the defendant was tried cannot
rationally be found "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" under the Chapman test. Because of the scope of discretion permitted the trial judge under our system and his possible reliance
on demeanor in making these rulings, an appellate court cannot
determine with sufficient certainty which rulings would have
been made if the judge had acted constititionally. For example,
decisions of a prejudiced trial judge on the admission of certain
evidence' 47 or on sentencing148 may not be reversible error in
themselves because they are within the discretion permitted to
the trial judge. But it would be impossible for an appellate
court to find with sufficient certainty that an unprejudiced trial
judge would have made the same decisions. For this reason,
constitutional errors involving the fitness or impartiality of the
judge before whom a defendant has been tried 149 should not be
reviewed to determine the harmlessness of the error, but should
instead constitute grounds for automatic reversal.
Other classes of constitutional error exhibit similar inherent
unpredictability in prejudicial effect. To deny unconstitution144. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to a trial by
jury in state courts). See also Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 446 (1965)
(official intrusion into the privacy of jury deliberation).
145. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
146. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967) (racial discrimination in
the selection of jurors); Coleman v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 129 (1964) (trial
judge excluded all testimony tending to prove that Negroes had been
excluded from the jury).
147. A number of evidentiary rules involve the vesting of considerable discretion in the trial judge. See, e.g., C. McCouMvcK, EVIDENCE,
§ 157(c), at 332-33 (1954) (discretion of trial judge to exclude evidence
of prior convictions even when it has independent relevance).
148. The trial judge has almost unreviewable discretion over sentencing in many states. See Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial
Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARv. L. REV. 821, 843-46 (1968).
149. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (judge with a financial
interest in the outcome); see Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 12
(1954).
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ally a defendant the opportunity to summon witnesses' 5" is an
error which cannot fairly be found to be "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt," because it is impossible to ascertain what the
testimony of the witnesses would have been had they been summoned. Nor can an appellate court intelligently assess the damage done to a defendant's case by an unconstitutional denial of
the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses.' 51 There is no
way of knowing "beyond a reasonable doubt" what the results of
the cross-examination would have been.
The second reason that certain classes of constitutional error
should always dictate automatic reversal is closely related to the
first. To the extent it is ever possible to evaluate the prejudicial
impact of an error below, the result of such evaluation with respect to certain classes of constitutional error will almost inevitably be a finding that the error was not "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt" under the Chapman rule. Thus, judicial
economy, the only real justification for a harmless error rule,
may dictate the application of a rule of automatic reversal to
these classes of cases. For example, the unconstitutional admission of a confession into evidence will almost always have an
extremely prejudicial impact on a defendant's case. Although
the state may produce a mountain of other evidence of the defendant's guilt, an appellate court could rarely, if ever, make a
finding that there was not "a reasonable possibility that the
evidence complained of [here, the confession] might have contributed to the conviction."'152 The California Supreme Court
held in People v. Schader 5 3 that even under the more lenient
California harmless error rule,15 4 which was overruled in Chapman, any wrongful admission of a confession should invoke a
rule of automatic reversal:
After holding that the confession should not have been admitted, we can only be concerned with the effect of the confession upon the jury's deliberation, regardless of the type of error
involved. It is because of the effect of the confession that the
reversal is compelled ....
In either case the confession operates as a kind of evidentiary bombshell which shatters the
defense....
Since we -have concluded that -the trial court should not have admitted the confessions, we need not consider other contentions urging their inadmissibility.155
150.
151.
380 U.S.
152.
153.
154.
155.

U.S. CoNST. amend. VI.
See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Douglas v. Alabama,
415 (1965).
See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
62 Cal. 2d 716, 401 P.2d 665, 44 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1965).
See CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, § 4%.
62 Cal. 2d 716, 730-31, 401 P.2d 665, 673-74, 44 Cal. Rptr. 193,

201-02 (1965).
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It is already clear that under Payne v. Arkansas'5 6 the admission of a coerced confession will always lead to an automatic
reversal. 157 The California Court's Schader opinion expresses a
persuasive argument for extending the rule of automatic reversal
to all confession cases:
In determining the prejudicial effect of the illegally obtained
confession at trial we are not concerned with the nature of the
error that caused the illegality. The reason that the confession
should not have been introduced into evidence is no longer material. As to its impact upon the jury and the prejudicial
effect, the confession obtained in violation of defendant's right
to counsel cannot be distinguished from the confession obtained
in violation of defendant's right to be free of coercion.
In this inquiry we cannot logically distinguish between the
different bases for the exclusion of the confession. It makes no
difference whether the confession was improperly obtained by
physical brutality, by threats of physical abuses or severe punishment, by implied promises of lenience or probation, by the
officer's promise to release defendant's wife or relative upon
defendant's confession, or by retention of the defendant incommunicado. It is immaterial whether the confession should
have been excluded as the fruit of an illegal arrest or illegal
search, or whether the admission of a confession was improper
because it was given after a refusal to allow defendant to consult or after an interference with his right to counsel or because
it was given by defendant without advice of his rights to counsel and to remain silent.
...[T]he argument that an illegally obtained confession
should be differently treated if it is "voluntarily" rendered cannot stand. To argue that a "voluntary" confession is more apt
than an "involuntary" one to be trustworthy and therefore its
effect upon the jury is different is -to rest upon a non sequitur.
It is again to confuse considerations as to inadmissibility of a
confession with its effect upon a jury.15s
Of course, it is possible to conjure up hypothetical cases in
which the admission of a confession-whether voluntary or coerced-could be held to be harmless. For example, the prosecution might admit two confessions, one free from error and the
other unconstitutional. 5 9 Or a confession might be unconstitutionally admitted into evidence after a defendant took the stand
and admitted his guilt. In these cases, an appellate court might
156. 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
157. See note 129 supra, and accompanying text. The possible rationales for applying a rule of automatic reversal when the confession
is coerced, but allowing an appellate court to find the unconstitutional
admission of voluntary confessions to be harmless error are discussed
later. See notes 190-202 infra, and accompanying text.
158. 62 Cal 2d. 716, 729-30, 401 P.2d 665, 673-74, 44 Cal Rptr. 193,
201-02 (1965) (citations omitted).
159. See People v. Jacobson, 46 Cal. Rptr. 515, 405 P.2d 555 (1965)
(conviction affirmed where prosecution introduced 10 confessions, two
of which violated Escobedo).
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well find that there was not "a reasonable possibility that the
evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction."'01 0 But in fashioning a rule which will maximize judicial
economy, the number of such cases should be balanced against
the overwhelming majority of confession cases in which it will be
virtually impossible for an appellate court to find that the error
is harmless under the Chapman rule.
Arguably, the inherently prejudicial nature of confessions
dictates the application of the automatic reversal rule to violations of Jackson v. Denno 61 and all other constitutional errors
involving situations where the objectionable confession is somehow disclosed to the jury.12 This would be true even though it
may not be formally admitted into evidence and although the
jury may be instructed to disregard the confession. 16 The same
"evidentiary bombshell" effect described above in SchaderTM obtains in these situations.
The application of the automatic reversal rule to confessions
should be extended to improper presentation to the jury or admission into evidence of inculpatory admissions. 65 Here, a defendant has not "confessed" to the crime, but he has admitted
some element of the prosecution's case or has made some out-ofcourt statement from which guilt inferences can be drawn. The
"bombshell effect" of a confession is present in most of these
cases. The statement appears before the jury clothed in special
persuasiveness because it came from the mouth of the defend00
ant.1
Another class of constitutional violations which could rarely,
if ever, be held harmless under the Chapman standard involves
cases in which the wrongful admission into evidence of the defendant's prior convictions is ruled constitutional error. In Burgett v. Texas'0 " the Supreme Court held that the admission of a
prior conviction, tainted because it resulted from a trial in which
160. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
161. 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (voluntary confession question cannot be
submitted to jury).
162. Cf. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
163. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 389 n.162 (1964).
164. See note 155 supra, and accompanying text.
165. But see People v. Hillery, 62 Cal. 2d 692, 401 P.2d 382, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 30 (1965) (California harmless error test applied to voluntary
admissions).
166. Defendant's inculpatory remarks in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964), were actually an admission rather than a confession.
The Supreme Court, however, did not even discuss the possibility that
admissions were to be treated differently from confessions.
167. 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
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the defendant had been denied his right to counsel, was itself constitutional error. Mr. Justice Douglas stated for the Court that
the error in Burgett could not be held harmless and implied that
all violations of Burgett call for automatic reversal:
The admission of a prior criminal conviction which is constitutionally infirm under the standards of Gideon v. Wainwright is
inherently prejudicial and we are unable to say that the instructions to disregard it made the constitutional error "harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt" within the meaning of Chapman v.
State of California .... 168
Prior convictions tend to have an incalculably potent impact
on the minds of jurors, 6 9 both because they are evidence of the
defendant's criminal proclivities and therefore of the likelihood
that he is guilty as charged, and because they can prejudice the
jury against the defendant and lead them to convict him as a
"bad man" regardless of the weight of the evidence. For these
reasons, prior convictions are generally inadmissible at common
law. 7 0 The inherently prejudicial impact of the wrongful admission of prior convictions will mean that appellate courts will
rarely be able to find such error "harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt." Because a consideration of the harmlessness of this class
of error will almost always lead to reversal under Chapman,
judicial economy again seems to dictate that a rule of automatic
reversal apply.
The discussion thus far has assumed that state appellate
courts will faithfully follow the Chapman test and therefore that
few errors which fall into the classes discussed above will ever
be found harmless. On this assumption, the rule of automatic
reversal makes sense purely in terms of judicial economy at the
state level. Automatic reversal will lead to few retrials which
would not have occurred under a harmless error test, and will
free state appellate courts from appraising harmlessness in a
large number of cases.
Of course, it is also possible that state appellate courts will
be less than diligent in their application of the Chapman rule
and that a large number of petitions for certiorari will result.1'71
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 112.
See C. McCoRMAcK, EVIDENc E § 157(c) (1954).
See generally J. WIGmORm, EVIDENCE §§ 192-194 (3d ed. 1940).

See also Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
The American Law Institute has advocated an extension of this rule
of inadmissibility to protect a defendant from the introduction of prior
convictions even when bet testifies in his own behalf. UNiromv RuLEs
or EVIDENCE 21.

171.

See Fontaine v. California, 390 U.S. 593 (1968).
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The Supreme Court may then be forced into a painstaking examination of these petitions followed by a series of decisions deciding the harmlessness of particular errors. However, the decisions
will offer little guidance in the litigation of the harmlessness of
future errors in different fact situations; Black's opinion that
the error was not harmless in Chapman rests at least in part on a
conclusion that "absent the constitutionally forbidden comments,
honest fair-minded jurors might very well have brought in notguilty verdicts."'172 Such a conclusion involves an analysis of the
entire record, and therefore is little more than a statement that
the error is prejudicial in that particular case.
One alternative to such a burdensome case-by-case supervision of the application of Chapman 73 would be to deny certiorari in most, if not all, cases contesting a state court's application in a particular fact situation; the ground would be that the
pressing business of the Court does not allow the luxury of granting certiorari when the decision cannot have any impact beyond
the petitioner's case.17 4 This would be unfortunate because it
might lead to a perpetuation of the very injustices which the
rigid harmless error test of Chapman was designed to correct. 7 5
It was partially a similar dilemma-a choice between a case-bycase adjudication of the voluntariness of confessions and the
risk of injustice-that influenced the Court to adopt rather formal
rules regulating the admissibility of confessions.' 76 A rule of automatic reversal, at least applied to those classes of cases in which
a review on certiorari would almost always result in a finding of
prejudice, would seem preferable to either of the alternatives
available in its absence.
2.

Errorswith an Inherent Tendency to Undermine the
Reliability of the Guilt-DeterminationProcess
Many constitutional rules exist to preserve the integrity and

172. 386 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1967).
173. It has been argued that the construction of the Chapman standard be left to state appellate courts. 81 HARv. L. REv. 1260, 1271-72
(1968).
174. See 1961 Sup. CT.REv. 1 passim (a case does not ordinarily reach
the Supreme Court on certiorari unless it raises questions of general
importance).
175. This is particularly true if convictions were affirmed under
an overly-loose construction of the Chapman test.
176. In "voluntariness" cases, the Supreme Court has asserted the
power to engage in "an independent examination of the whole record."
Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967). The Miranda rule will usually
make this kind of exhaustive examination of the facts unnecessary. Id.
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the reliability of the process of guilt determination. Violations of
these rules detract from that integrity and reliability, and may
result in the conviction of an innocent man. It is therefore arguable that convictions which are tainted with such violations are
inherently unreliable and should be scrutinized with special care.
Of course, every harmless error test is intended to achieve this
scrutiny by providing for the reversal of any conviction which
was obtained through error. Proper application of the Chapman test would seem to be a sufficient safeguard against conviction of the innocent. But it has been argued that because constitutional errors which endanger the reliability of the guilt-determination process create a speciaa peril, they should be sub77
jected to a rule of automatic reversal.
Most classes of constitutional error affect the reliability of
the process of guilt determination and are errors for that very
reason. Involuntary confessions are inherently unreliable. 178
Denial of the right to counsel may result in the conviction of an
innocent man. 7 9 Findings of a prejudiced judge or jury are infected with the danger of falsehood. 8 0 There are, in fact, few
constitutional errors which do not present this danger. Violations of Mapp v. Ohio' s ' do not really affect the reliability of the
process of guilt-determination.
Evidence which has been
obtained through an unconstitutional search is not inherently
unreliable 82 and its admission creates no real tendency to convict the innocent. 8 3 The reason that all evidence obtained
through an unconstitutional search must be excluded
is that such
84
a rule deters unconstitutional police conduct.
In his concurring opinion in Chapman,8 5 Stewart suggests
that although a rule of automatic reversals should apply to violations of Griffin v. California,18 6 a harmless error rule may be
applicable to violations of Mapp v. Ohio:
For example, quite different considerations are involved when
evidence is introduced which was obtained in violation of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The exclusionary rule in
177. This is the position advanced in the Stanford Note at 88-91.
178. See Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 n.15 (1958).
179. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
180. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
181. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
182. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 638-39 (1965).
183. Id.
184. J. LANDYxsKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT
76 (1966). See generally Stanford Note at 93-94.
185. 386 U.S. 18, 42-45 (1967).
186. 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (comment on defendant's refusal to testify
violates fifth amendment self-incrimination protection).
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that context balances the desirability of deterring objectionable
police conduct against the undesirability of excluding relevant
and reliable evidence. The resolution of these values with interests of judicial economy might well dictate a harmlesserror rule for such violations.s7
A similar argument might be made with respect to confessions excluded under Miranda.89 When such confessions are
"voluntary," the real reason for their exclusion is not the danger
of their unreliability, but rather a policy of discouraging police
misconduct.8 9 This argument is reinforced by the fact that
Miranda has been applied only prospectively. 190 If the policy of
either Mapp or Miranda were to safeguard the reliability of the
guilt-determination process and to prevent the conviction of the
innocent, a retrospective application would seem necessary. 19 1
Of course, "involuntary" confessions do present special problems
of reliability; their exclusion is at least partially due to their inherent tendency to be false. 192 This may be the rationale behind
the application3 of the rule of automatic reversal to coerced con9
fession cases.1
Thus, the policy with respect to confessions, suggested by the
reliability of the guilt-determination rationale, would involve a
number of steps: first, it must be determined whether there is
constitutional error; then, if there is constitutional error, one
must determine whether the confession was "voluntary" or "involuntary." If it is held to be "involuntary," a rule of automatic
reversal should be applied. If the confession is "voluntary," but
its admission constituted a violation of Miranda, the harmless
error test under Chapman should be applicable. This approach
is suggested by the dissent in People v. Schader:
Under the holding of Dorado, the improper admission of such
statements and confession, found to have been voluntarily given,
is placed in the same category as the admission of an involuntary confession and the effect upon the jury is deemed prejudicial as a matter of law compelling reversal. I believe this
holding in Dorado to have been error and that the prejudice
187.

386 U.S. 18, 44 n.2.

188.

384 U.S. 436 (1966).

189. Id. at 456-57. See generally Stanford Note at 94-95.
190. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
191. But see id. at 728-29: "We emphasize that the question whether
a constitutional rule of criminal procedure does or does not enhance the
reliability of the fact-finding process at trial is necessarily a matter of
degree." The balance between the degree of unreliability and the inconvenience caused by a rule of automatic reversal may be resolved
differently from the balance involved in deciding for or against retrospective application.
192. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
193. Id.
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which results from the use of an improperly received voluntary
confession is not necessarily the same as that which the Supreme
Court of the United States has held to result from the use of an
involuntary confession.
A voluntary confession does not suffer the disabilities of
an involuntary one. A voluntary confession is normally trustworthy, it does not offend "the community's sense of fair play
and decency" because it has not been the product of coercion or
force, and its exclusion does not serve to discourage improper
police tactics. 194

The majority held that all confessions should invoke a rule of
automatic reversal. 195
The difficulty with this process is that it would involve
appellate courts in the same after-the-fact voluntariness deter-

minations that the rule of Miranda was designed to avoid.9

6

The Miranda opinion stressed that coercion was inherent in the
interrogatory process,'197 and its broad exclusionary rule seems

to have been partially intended to insure the exclusion of every
coercion-tainted confession. 98
Even assuming that "voluntary" confessions should not invoke a rule of automatic reversal, the process of determining
whether a particular confession was voluntary would be burdensome. The Supreme Court would have to supervise it closely to
protect the rights of defendants."9 In addition, the process
would not effect a net judicial economy; even admission of voluntary confessions would be prejudicial under the harmless error
rule in the overwhelming majority of cases.200 Thus, based on
the reliability of the guilt-determination process rationale, the interests of judicial economy dictate that a rule of automatic reversal be applied to all confession cases.
One difficulty with the reliability of the guilt-determination
process approach is that the Court may have implicitly rejected
it in Chapman by applying the harmless error rule to violations
of Griffin.201 One of the reasons Griffin prohibits prosecutors
from commenting on and drawing inferences from a defendant's
silence is that "the inference of guilt is not always so natural or
irresistible." 20 2 Griffin violations, therefore, impair the reli194. See 62 Cal. 2d 716, 734-35, 401 P.2d 665, 676, 44 Cal. Rptr. 193,
204 (1965).
195. See id. at 729-30, 401 P.2d at 673-74, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 201-02.
196. See text accompanying note 176 supra.
197.

384 U.S. 436, 461-67 (1968).

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See text
Id.
See text
See text
380 U.S.

accompanying note 176 supra.
accompanying notes 152-160 supra.
accompanying note 186 supra.
609, 614-15 (1965).
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ability of the guilt-determination process and should be subjected to a rule of automatic reversal.
It can also be argued, however, that the central thrust of the
Griffin rule did not relate to the reliability of the guilt-deter20 4
mination process. 20 3 In Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott
the Supreme Court held that the Griffin rule would not be applied retrospectively and stated:
The basic purposes that lie behind the privilege against
self-incrimination do not relate to protecting the innocent from
conviction, but rather to preserving the integrity of a judicial
system in which even the guilty are not to be205
convicted unless
the prosecution "shoulder[s] the entire load."
This is a rather conclusory rationale for the Griffin rule, but it
would seem that if the purpose of Griffin were really to protect
the innocent from conviction, justice would have required its
retrospective application. At any rate, analysis of Griffin not
only indicates that the Supreme Court may have already rejected the reliability of the guilt-determination process approach,
but also illustrates the difficulty of discovering why certain errors are held to violate the Constitution. This difficulty will
mean that weeding out those classes of error which taint the
reliability of the guilt-determination process will itself consume
considerable judicial energy-another factor to be considered in
fashioning a rule which will promote net judicial economy.
The conclusion must be that the only constitutional errors
which clearly do not taint the reliability of the guilt-determination process are violations of Mapp v. Ohio.20 6 An application of
the rationale discussed in this section might limit the harmless
error rule to Mapp violations and necessitate automatic reversal
for all other constitutional errors.
3. Errors which Undermine Deterrence of Unconstitutional
Police Conduct
Some constitutional rules have as at least one of their purposes the deterrence of unconstitutional police conduct. Thus,
the fruits of unconstitutional police searches are excluded under
Mapp20 7 to discourage such searches by making them pointless.
2 08
Similarly, the rule of Miranda
and even the exclusion of co203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

See generally Stanford Note at 89-90.
382 U.S. 406 (1966).
Id. at 415.
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Id.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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erced confessions 2 9 are at least partially an attempt to deter
unconstitutional tactics by police. It has been argued that the
court's role of "policing the police" can be fulfilled only if violations of these constitutional rules are made grounds for automatic reversal. Professor Kamisar has argued that this is the rationale for the application of the rule of automatic reversal to coerced confessions:
The Court has been reluctant to spell out that the function of
the "automatic reversal" rule involves disciplining of policeprosecutor activity, perhaps because of loud cries that the
courts should not "police the police." But this is what the
Court is doing. The only good reason for overturning a conviction whenever a coerced confession is introduced at the trialeven though the testimony of your twenty bishops covers the
same matter-is to be found in the "police methods" rationale
which now 210underlies the constitutional ban against coerced
confessions.
it has been pointed out above that there are other, more persuasive rationales for automatic reversal in coerced confession
cases.

211

It would seem that the increment to deterrence of unconstitutional police conduct that automatic reversal would achieve
would be negligible. 212 The Chapman harmless error test should
provide a sufficient safeguard against the danger that police will
go on misbehaving in the hope that the fruits of that misbehavior will enable them to obtain convictions. Innocent police
misconduct will not be deterred by even a rule of automatic
reversal. And, of course, conscious police misconduct which is
not motivated by a desire to obtain convictions cannot be affected at all by the nature of the conviction reversal rule. Only
on the presumption that some police will violate constitutional
standards, in the hope that the trial judge will erroneously admit
the evidence obtained and that the appellate court will erroneously find the error harmless, will a harmless error rule encourage police misconduct motivated by a desire to obtain convictions.

213

4. Errors which Undermine the Deterrence of Unconstitutional
ProsecutorialConduct
The combination of the adversary system and the respon209.

See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945).

210. Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later, 61 MycH. L. REv.
219, 239-40 (1962) (footnotes omitted).
211. See text accompanying notes 152-160 supra.
212. See 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 208 (1967).

213. Id.
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sibility of the prosecutor under oath to uphold the Constitution
creates a tension central in the prosecutorial role. Almost all
constitutional rules defining criminal due process have as one
purpose, or at least as an indirect result, the deterrence of untoward prosecutorial conduct. For example, the Miranda and
Mapp rules deter the prosecution from attempting to introduce
objectionable evidence by providing for reversal of at least those
convictions in which the admission of such evidence had a prejudicial impact. It has been argued that the special sensitivity of
a prosecutor toward automatic reversal dictates application of
such a rule to all violations of rules which deter prosecutorial
misconduct:
It would seem that a prosecutor is significantly more sensitive
to reversal on appeal than a policeman. Thus the real damage
which would have been wrought by an abandonment of the
"automatic reversal" principle would not have been a deletion
of the deterrent effect of the confession doctrines on the police,
considerable though this might have been, as much as the
immeasurable
214 diminution of the force of these doctrines on the
prosecution.
However, such an approach would whittle down the Chapman
harmless error rule to almost nothing. Almost every constitutional error involves some prosecutorial misconduct-certainly
the Griffin rule, to which the harmless error rule was applied in
Chapman, focuses solely on prosecutorial misconduct.
It may make sense to apply automatic reversal to those cases
in which an element of the constitutional error itself is the
knowing misconduct of the prosecutor. In most cases, it makes no
difference whether the prosecutor was blackhearted; violations
of Griffin, Miranda, and Mapp do not depend on whether the
prosecutor realized that his.conduct was wrong. But, in cases
like Mooney v. Holohan,215 or Alcorta v. Texas,21 63 in which the
constitutional error is the knowing use of perjured testimony, an
element of the constitutional violation is scienter on the part of
the prosecutor. Similarly, in cases like Brady v. Maryand,217 in
which it was held that defendant's right to due process was
violated by the prosecution's suppression of evidence favorable
to the defense, the prosecutor's knowledge is an essential element
of the constitutional violation. In thee cases it has been argued
that automatic reversal may deter prosecutors from ever attempting the forbidden conduct:
214.
215.
216.
217.

See Kamisar, supra note 210, at 244.
294 U.S. 103 (1935).
355 U.S. 28 (1957).
373 U.S. 83 (1963).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:519

This reasoning may ring true for many cases, even most, but
it simply does not warrant reversal in all cases where perjured
testimony is knowingly used, however overwhelming the other
untainted evidence. It does not satisfactorily explain upsetting a
conviction when, for example, the perjured testimony is confirmed in every respect by the testimony of twenty bishops.
Whatever the Court's linguistics when and if it formulates a rule
of "automatic reversal" in the perjury cases, whether or not it
will dwell on the police or prosecutor misconduct in the case,
misconduct by officers of the law will nevertheless be the deci218
sive factor.
Although a strict application of the Chapman standard
would seem to provide sufficient deterrence to prosecutorial use
of perjured testimony or prosecutorial suppression of evidence,
the special sensitivity of prosecutors to a rule of automatic reversal may justify its application here as an added deterrent.
5.

Errors which Undermine Public Respect for the Adjudicatory
System

Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinions in both Chapman21
and Fahy220 suggest another category of constitutional errors
appropriate for automatic reversal. Certain errors, regardless of
the merits of the particular case and the extent of their prejudicial impact to the defendant, may have such an adverse effect
on public confidence in the judicial system that their presence
dictates automatic reversal. Certainly, any error which goes to
the competence or impartiality of either the judge or the jury
before whom the defendant is tried tends to subvert public respect for the adjudicatory system. As discussed above, 221 these
classes of constitutional error also have an indeterminable impact on the outcome of the proceedings and should trigger automatic reversal for that reason as well.
223
222
Harlan gave Tumey v. Ohio and Berger v. United States
as examples of cases requiring automatic reversal under this
rationale. In Berger, which involved prosecutorial misconduct
in a federal case, the decision to reverse was based more on the
Supreme Court's supervisory power of federal courts than on the
requirements of constitutional due process. 224 Writing for a
218. See Kamisar, supra note 210, at 242.
219. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
220. 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
221. See notes 143-149 supra, and accompanying text.
222. 273 U.S. 510 (1929); see notes 118-120 supra, and accompanying text.
223. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
224. See 2 P. FREUND, A. SUTHaL-AND, M. HowE, & E. BROWN, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 1120 (2d ed. 1961).
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unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Sutherland stated:
In these circumstances prejudice to the cause of the accused is
so highly probable that we are not justified in assuming its
non-existence. If the case against Berger had been strong, or,
as some courts have said, the evidence of his guilt
225 "overwhelming," a different conclusion might be reached.
This implies that a harmless error rule, rather than a rule of
automatic reversal, was being applied by the Berger Court. On
the other hand, more recent decisions22 6 have applied a rule of
automatic reversal to cases of intentional prosecutorial misconduct. Indeed, in Mesarosh v. United States, 22 7 the unintentional
use by the prosecutor of perjured testimony was held to be
ground for automatic reversal because of a need to insure that
'228
"the waters of justice are not polluted.
It has also been suggested that concern with the appearance
of justice is the basis upon which a rule of automatic reversal is
and should be applied to errors which involve official misconduct.2 209 A similar basis existed in cases such as Black v. United
States230 and O'Brien v. United States 231 in which defendants
were subjected to official eavesdropping and automatic reversal
232
was applied.
Another example of this consideration is Rochin v. California,233 the notorious stomach-pump case. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, stated:
To sanction the brutal conduct which naturally enough was
condemned by the court whose judgment is before us, would be
to afford brutality the cloak of law. Nothing would be more
calculated to2 34discredit law and thereby to brutalize the temper
of a society.

The Supreme Court, in its role as guardian of the legal system,
reversed the conviction in Rochin despite the fact that the evidence objected to was perfectly reliable.
In all of these cases-the use of perjured testimony, official
interference with the jury, government eavesdropping, and the
stomach-pump case-official misconduct is involved. As dis225.

295 U.S. 78, 89 (1935).

226. See, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Rernmer v.
United States, 350 U.S. 377 (1956).
227. 352 U.S. 1 (1956).
228. Id. at 14.
229. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 52 r7 (1967) (dissenting
opinion).
230. 385 U.S. 26 (1966).
231.

386 U.S. 345 (1967).

232. But see Hoffa v. United States, 387 U.S. 231 (1967).
erally 81 HARV. L. REv. 1260, 1273-76 (1968).
233.

342 U.S. 165 (1952).

234. Id. at 173-74.

See gen-
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cussed above, an alternative rationale for the automatic reversal
of these cases is the deterrence of such misconduct. These two
rationales-preserving the appearance of justice and deterring
official misconduct-are usually complementary; both seem to
militate in favor of automatic reversal in the same categories of
cases. In cases involving unintentional official misconduct 23
automatic reversal can probably be justified only on the appearance of justice rationale. The gravamen of the opinion is that
certain kinds of official misbehavior are so objectionable and
so greatly undermine public respect for the system, that the Supreme Court has a duty to reverse convictions achieved through
such misbehavior; this would emphasize to the public officials
and the public at large that such misbehavior is anathema. Perhaps the importance of a public denunciation of certain gross
forms of official misconduct outweighs the judicial economy that
might be achieved by the application of a harmless error rule to
these cases and thereby dictates automatic reversal.
D.

CONCLUSION

The various rationales for applying automatic reversal to
different classes of cases often overlap. Coerced confessions, for
example, are (1) inherently prejudicial, (2) inherently unreliable,
(3) examples of police misconduct, (4) examples of prosecutorial
misconduct, and (5) examples of conduct which will undermine
public confidence in the system of criminal adjudication. Other
classes of constitutional error may seem appropriate for automatic reversal under one or more of the approaches suggested
236
above.
If different categories of constitutional error are to be established for this purpose, it is important that they be easily definable. After all, the justification for a harmless error rule is
judicial economy; this goal is hardly served faithfully if the
question of which category a particular instance of constitutional
error falls into is a subject of constant litigation. Thus, a category of "coerced confessions" would prove unworkable because
the "voluntariness" of the erroneously admitted confession
would be a difficult issue to resolve in a large number of cases.
The first approach suggestEd-application of a rule of auto235. See, e.g., Mesaroch v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956).
236. For example, jury discrimination is inherently prejudicial,
taints the reliability of the conviction, and decreases public respect for
the adjudicatory system, but does not involve police or prosecutorial
misconduct.
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matic reversal to those classes of error which are inherently prejudicial in nature-may make the most sense; it deals with the
harmless error problem in terms of the justification for a harmless error rule-judicial economy. The other approaches involve
the notion that such policies as insuring reliability, deterring
police and prosecutor misconduct, and preventing affronts to the
judicial system demand automatic reversal. All of these policies
should be achieved by the strict application of the Chapman
harmless error rule-the innocent will not be convicted on unreliable and unconstitutional evidence, police and prosecutors will
be deterred from trying to achieve convictions through unconstitutional conduct, and public respect for the system will be preserved if no man whose conviction is based on shocking official
misbehavior is imprisoned. But special care in preserving these
policies may militate in favor of the application of automatic
reversal when it appears that the policy behind the constitutional rule may thereby be advanced substantially. 237 In addition, the Court should bear in mind the danger that state appellate courts will construe Chapman loosely and the Supreme
Court will be inundated with petitions for certiorari. Such a
situation would force the Court to choose between neglecting its
other business and allowing the rights safeguarding unreview238
able state court decisions.
If the net impact of this analysis is a suggestion that the
application of a rule of automatic reversal to all constitutional
errors might not be an appropriate resolution of these problems,
that suggestion is not altogether unintended. Perhaps, as Mr.
Justice Stewart intimated in his concurring opinion in Chapman,230 a general rule of automatic reversal could permit certain
exceptions-particular categories of constitutional error to which
a harmless error rule might be applied. The definition of such
categories would involve the exact reverse of the analysis undertaken here.240 As long as Chapman stands, however, the
Court, if only in an effort to further the interest of net judicial
economy, should attempt to delineate certain well-defined classes
of constitutional error which require automatic reversal.

237. For example, the fact that prosecutors are more sensitive to
reversal on appeal than are policemen may mean that automatic reversal would further the goal of deterring untoward prosecutorial misconduct, but have little impact on police misconduct.
238. See 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 1 passim.
239. 386 U.S. 18, 42-45 (1967).
240. See id. at 44 n.2.

